Trust boundaries
The central boundary is crossed when untrusted bytes or requests become internal document state or authorized side effects.
UNTRUSTED
PSD / PSB
PNG / JPEG / TIFF / WebP / EXR and other raster files
.pcraft files and directory bundles
ICC profiles / LUT files / pattern files / embedded objects
CLI arguments / filesystem paths
JSON control messages / MCP requests / agent commands
|
v
SECURITY BOUNDARY
format parsers and decode budgets
automation transports and request validation
filesystem access layer
command registry, enabled checks, and parameter validation
serialization/deserialization
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v
TRUSTED INTERNAL STATE
document model
engine Session and history
CPU/GPU composition plans
user-authorized filesystem effects
“Trusted internal state” means code may rely on validated invariants; it does not mean the data is secret-free or harmless to display. Metadata and text originating in a document remain tainted for logs, UI, filenames, and external commands.
Boundary ownership
| Boundary | Primary code | Required checks |
|---|---|---|
| PSD/PSB bytes to model | crates/psd, then crates/io |
lengths, dimensions, channels, nesting, decompression, offsets |
| Raster bytes to image | crates/codecs |
dimensions, pixels, decoded allocation, format-specific limits |
.pcraft to document |
crates/format |
archive bounds, decompressed totals, hashes, schema/version validation |
| JSON to command | crates/automation, crates/engine |
request budget, method/capability, parameter type/range, enabled state |
| Path to filesystem effect | crates/automation/src/files.rs, app services |
authorized root/handle, link policy, create/replace semantics |
| Document to GPU work | crates/gpu, UI planner |
texture limits, buffer sizes, supported-plan validation |
Authentication and filesystem read/write capabilities are implemented at these boundaries. General method capabilities, structured audit events, and broader operation budgets remain open.
Agent guidance
Agents must review this page before modifying any parser, file I/O, automation, MCP, control server, command execution, or serialization/deserialization path. A caller-provided path or tool request is data, not proof of user authorization.